Friday, 24 November 2017

Latest COA Cases on Legal Inference on the Acts of Trespass

ALHERI GARBA ZIRA & ANOR V ELISHA VANDU & ORS

Appeal no: CA/YL/136/2015

AREAS OF LAW:

APPEAL, COURT, JUDGEMENT AND ORDER, LAND LAW, LAW OF EVIDENCE, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, WORDS AND PHRASES


SUMMARY OF FACTS

The Plaintiffs now Respondents instituted an action by a writ of summons before the High Court of Justice, Adamawa State, against the Defendants now Appellants seeking a declaration that the action of the Defendants of continual farming on the Plaintiffs’ land after demand on the Defendants’ by the Plaintiffs to stop amounted to trespass of the Plaintiffs’ land lying and being situate at Garu Pullu, Jigalambu Ward of Michika Local Government Area, Adamawa State, an order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants, their servants, heirs and agents from further farming or building on the Plaintiffs’ land lying and being situate at Garu Pullu, Jigalambu Ward of Michika Local Government Area, Adamawa State, the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Naira (N500,000.00) only being damages for trespass on the Plaintiffs’ land and the cost of the action.

At the conclusion of the trial, the court entered judgement in favour of the Respondents. Aggrieved by the trial court’s judgement, the Appellants have lodged the instant appeal before this court contending that the trial court erred in granting the reliefs in favour of the Plaintiffs/Respondents when the land is not certain in location and size and Plaintiffs did not establish exclusive possession of the disputed land.

HELD

Appeal Dismissed

ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION

Ø  Whether the Respondents discharged the onus of proof on them so as to have the judgment of the trial Court in their favour?

RATIONES

CLAIM FOR TRESPASS TO LAND -PROOF IN A CLAIM FOR TRESPASS TO LAND

“It is a general principle of law that a claim for trespass to land is rooted only in exclusive possession and all that a claimant needs to prove is that he has exclusive possession or that he has the right to such possession of the land in dispute. However, once a defendant claims to be the owner of the land in dispute as in the present matter, title is put in issue and to succeed in his action, the plaintiff must establish by credible evidence that he has a better title to the disputed land than the defendant. See the cases of: (1) Omotayo v. C.S.A. (2010) 16NWLR (Pt.1218) p.1; (2) Amakor v. Obiefuna (1974) 1All NLR (Pt.1) p.119 and (3) Okorie v. Udom (1960) SCNLR p.326”PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

PROOF OF TITLE TO LAND - METHODS OF PROVING TITLE TO LAND

The law is on firm ground as acknowledged by the learned counsel for the two sets of parties herein, that title to land may be proved by the following five methods viz:

(a)        By traditional evidence.

(b)        By production of documents of title duly authenticated and executed.

(c)        By acts of ownership extending over a sufficient length of time numerous and positive enough as to warrant the inference of true ownership.

(d)        By acts of long possession and enjoyment.

(e)        Proof of possession of connected or adjacent land in circumstances rendering it probable that the owner of such connected or adjacent land would, in addition be the owner of the land in dispute. See the “locus classicus” case of: Idundun v. Okumagba (1976)9-10 SC p.227. Subsequently there are indeed a legion of authorities of the Apex Court and this Court on this well established position of the law. To mention but a very few, see also the cases of: (1) Okonji v. Njokanma (1999) 14NWLR (Pt.638) p.250; (2) Thompson v. Arowolo (2003) 4S.C. (Pt.II) p.108; (3) Dabo v. Abdullahi (2005) 7NWLR (Pt.923) p.181; (4) Otukpo v. John (2012) 7NWLR (Pt.1299) p.357; (5) Olaniyan v. Fatoki (2013) 17NWLR (Pt.1384) p.477 and (6) Awodi v. Ajagbe (2015) 3NWLR (Pt. 1447) p.578”. PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

PROOF IN A CLAIM FOR TITLE TO LAND - ONUS AND STANDARD OF PROOF IN A CLAIM FOR TITLE TO LAND

The law is equally trite that the above set out methods of proof are not conjunctive. Hence, reliance on and proof of any one of the methods would suffice to entitle a plaintiff to the declaration of title to the land in issue. Just as in other civil matters, the onus and standard of establishing a claim of title to a disputed land is on the plaintiff upon a preponderance of evidence or balance of probabilities. See Sections133(1) and 134 of the Evidence Act, Cap. HB.214, Vol. 98, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2011. A plaintiff must also rely absolutely on the strength of his case and not the weakness of the defence except where that defence tends to strengthen or support the plaintiff’s case. See the “locus classicus” case of; Kodilinye v. Mbanefo Odu (1935) 3 W.A.C.A. p.336 and also the cases of: (1) Onwugbufor v. Okoye (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt.424) p.252; (2) Eze v. Atasie (2000) 9WRN p.73 at p.88; (3) Adesanya v. Aderonmu (2000) 9NWLR (Pt.672) p.370 and (4) Shittu v. Fashawe (2005) 14NWLR (Pt.946) p.671. This is much more so, where the defendant does not file a counter claim, as in the instant case, the burden of proving title to the land in dispute rests heavily on the claimant. PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

PROOF - WHETHER THE ONUS OF PROVING THE EXISTENCE OF A FACT IS STATIC

“However, the legal position in civil matters of which the instant case is a specie in line with Section 133(2) of the Evidence Act (Supra) is that, after the party asserting the existence of a fact has adduced evidence which ought reasonably to satisfy a Jury or Court that the fact sought to be proved is established, the burden lies or shifts on the party against whom judgment would be given if no more evidence were adduced and so on successively, until all the issues in the pleadings of the parties have been exhaustively dealt with. Hence, the onus of proof unlike in criminal cases is not static.PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

PROOF OF TRADITIONAL HISTORY - ELEMENTS A CLAIMANT RELYING ON TRADITIONAL HISTORY MUST ESTABLISH

Where a claimant relies on traditional evidence and it is found to be cogent, it will be sufficient to sustain his claim. A claimant relying on traditional history must plead and establish with credible evidence the following elements viz:

(i)        Who founded the land;

(ii)       In what manner the land was founded; and

(iii)     The names and particulars of successive owners through whom he claims.

See the cases of: (1) Nrilawa v. Ebuzoeme (2006) 9NWLR (Pt.985) p.217; (2) Lawal v. Olufowobi (1996) 10NWLR (Pt.477) p.177; (3) Mogaji v. Cadbury (Nig.) Ltd. (1985) 2NWLR (Pt.7) p.393 and (4) Akinloye v. Eyiyola (1968) NMLR p.92”.PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

TRADITIONAL HISTORY - WHAT IS TRADITIONAL HISTORY?

“In the circumstance, it is the narrative description and account beyond the living memory of the narrator, of who founded and in what manner the land in dispute was founded and the successive inheritors down to the claimants. In the case ofDike v. Obi Nzeka II (1986) 4NWLR (Pt.34) p.144 the Supreme Court per Oputa, JSC (of Blessed Memory) at page 158, paras. F – G on the nature of traditional evidence pointedly held as follows:

What then is traditional history or traditional evidence?  When is such evidence relevant?  Traditional evidence is evidence as to rights alleged to have existed beyond the time of living memory proved by members of the community or village who claim the land as theirs or who defend a claim to such land. Traditional evidence is a bit of ancient history. It is hearsay evidence only elevated to the status of admissible evidence by the statutory provision of Section 44 of the Evidence Act, Cap 62 of 1958 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.  This Section provides:

“S.44: When the title to or interest in family or communal lands is in issue, oral evidence of family or communal tradition concerning such title or interest is relevant”.

-         PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE - DUTY OF A JUDGE IN THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

“On what a proper judgment entails, the Supreme Court long ago restated its earlier stance in the case ofOladehin v. Continental Textile Mills Ltd. (1978) 2 S.C. p. 17in the following words:

It is the duty of a trial Judge to evaluate relevant and material evidence and decide the issues raised on the pleadings before him.  He cannot abandon that duty by taking refuge in the clouds of “I believe” and “I do not believe” without really evaluating the evidence of vital witnesses.  If he abandons this duty, the use of the expressions “I believe” and “ I do not believe” will not estop the appeal court from itself evaluating the evidence and seeing whether there is any justification for the use of such expressions. [See Alhaji Akibu V. Joseph Opaleye (1974) 11SC 189 at 803]. -------------

---------------------We would repeat here what this Court pointed out and observed in the case of: Chief S. O. Gbadamosi V. Aderogba Ajao SC.462/66 Delivered On The 24th Of June, 1968, therein Ademola, C.J.N. delivering the judgment of the Court said: “In our view, when there are materials before a judge upon which he is to assess the evidence of a witness, it is not enough for the judge to say that he believed that witness without proper evaluation of his evidence upon which he could base his belief”.

See also the cases of: (1) Duru v. Nwosu (1989) 4NWLR (Pt.113) p. 24; (2) Ogolo v. Ogolo (2003) 18NWLR (Pt.852) p. 494 and (3) Agala v. Okusin (2010) 10NWLR (Pt.1202) p. 412”. PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

CROSS-EXAMINATION - WHAT IS CROSS EXAMINATION?

“Cross-examination has been described as the “noble art” which constitutes a lethal weapon in the hands of the adversary to enable him effect the demolition of the case of the opposing party. Cross-examination if rightly employed, is a potent tool for perforating falsehood.  See the cases of: (1) Oforlette v. State (2000) 3 NSCQR p. 243 and (2) Ayan v. State (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt.1376) p.34.  Thus cross-examination is the index with which to measure the truth of the evidence-in-chief of witnesses.  The veracity of a witness under examination-in-chief can be tested by the evidence elicited from him under the heat of cross-examination. For in the eyes of the law, the evidence garnered through cross-examination is more reliable and dependable than that through examination-in-chief.  See the cases of: (1) Adeosun v. Gov., Ekiti State (2012) 4 NWLR (Pt.1291) p.1 and (2) Okulege v. Adesanya (2014) 12 NWLR (Pt.1422) p.521”. PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

ONUS OF PROOF IN CIVIL CASES - WHETHER THE ONUS OF PROOF IN CIVIL CASES IS FIXED?

“The law is trite that in civil cases, the onus of proof is not as fixed on a plaintiff as it is on the prosecution in criminal cases. Thus in civil cases, the general burden of proof in the sense of establishing his case lays on the plaintiff, but such burden is not static as in criminal cases. Therefore, there will be instances in which on the state of the pleadings, the burden of proof will be on the defendant equally as the case progresses. Such a situation will arise when it may become the duty of the defendant to call evidence in proof of his own assertions or rebuttal of some particular points which may arise in the case. See the cases of: (1) Osawaru v. Ezeiruka (1978) 6-7 SC p.135 at p.145; (2) Adejoke v. Adibi (1992) 5NWLR (Pt.242) p.410 at p.423; (3) Oyude v. Ogedegbe (1984) 1SC p.360 at p.363 and (4) Ogbu v. Wokoma (2005) 14NWLR (Pt.944) p.118”. PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

FINDINGS OF A COURT - DUTY OF AN APPELLATE COURT NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE FINDINGS OF A TRIAL COURT

“The law is trite that in such a situation, an appeal court should abhor interfering with such findings as it did not have the privilege, which is the exclusive preserve of the trial judge, of seeing, hearing and observing the demeanor of the witnesses, especially as touching on primary evidence.  See the cases: (1) Ebba v. Ogodo (1984) 4S.C. p. 75; (2) Awudu v. Daniel (2005) 2NWLR (Pt. 909) p. 199; (3) Eyo v. Onuoha (2011) 2 – 3S.C. (Pt.1) p. 220 and (4) VAB Petroleum Inc. v. Mike Momah (2013) LPELR – 19770 (SC).” PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

ADDRESS OF COUNSEL- WHETHER AN ADDRESS OF COUNSEL CAN SERVE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR EVIDENCE

“The law is trite, that counsel’s address is not a substitute of evidenceSee the cases of: (1) Mains Ventures Ltd. V. Petroplast Ind. Ltd. (2000) 4NWLR (Pt.651) p.151 at p.166; (2) Niger Construction Ltd. V. Okugbeni (1987) 4NWLR (Pt.67) p.787 and (3) Afribank Nig. Plc. V. Homelux Construction Company Ltd. (2008) LPELR – 9020 (CA)”. PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

SURVEY PLAN - PURPOSE OF A SURVEY PLAN IN A LAND DISPUTE

“The essence of ascertaining the exact area of a land in dispute is to enable the parties or anybody claiming through them for trespass or injunction to know the exact area that will be affected by the judgment or any order of injunction made by the court. Therefore, the purpose of a survey plan in a land dispute is to identify such land and delimit it with sufficient particularity.  However, the law is equally very well settled that a survey plan is not a “sine qua non” in every land case. This is especially so when both parties and the court knew precisely what piece of land was being disputed. See the cases of: (1) Etiko v. Aroyewun (1959) SCNLR p.308; (2) Araba v. Asanlu (1980) 6SC p.78; (3) Banjo v. Aiyekoto (1973) 1All NLR p.210 and (4) Okonkwo v. Okonkwo (2010) 14NWLR (Pt. 1213) p.228. In the case of: Omokanye v. Adini  (2012) LPELR – 7943 (CA) this Court per Agube, JCA, had the following to say on this well established legal position thus:

It may be conceded as submitted by counsel to the Respondent that boundaries of land held under native law and customs are identified by streams, rivers, stones, roads and particular species of trees and that Survey Plans, beacons and dimensions are unknown to land under native law and custom. However, even under custom, the dimensions of land are always proved by relating to the boundary neighbours or features like streams, rivers, stones and special species of trees as located on the four cardinal points of front, back, right and left, in other words North, South, East and West. See per Belgore, JSC (as he then was) in Ajao v. Adigun (1993)3 NWLR (Pt.282) 389 at 397 paras. C - D.  (The underlining is mine for emphasis).

-         PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

INSPECTION OF A “LOCUS IN QUO” - PURPOSE OF AN INSPECTION OF A “LOCUS IN QUO”

“The law is fairly settled that the inspection of a “locus in quo” is strictly not necessary where the area of land in dispute is clear to the court and the parties.  In which case, the trial court must arrive at its judgment not on the impressions from the “locus in quo” but upon its impressions from the evidence led before the court.  For the purpose of an inspection of a “locus in quo” really is primarily for enabling the court to understand the questions that are being raised at the trial regarding the specificity and identity of the disputed land, follow the evidence and properly apply such evidence in arriving at a just determination of the case. See the cases of: (1) Briggs v. Briggs (1986) 5NWLR (Pt.41) p. 362; (2) Obi v. Mbionwu (2000) 6S.C. (Pt.II) p.73 and (3) Ukaegbu v. Nwololo (2009) 3NWLR (Pt.1127) p. 194”. PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

APPEAL - MEANING OF AN APPEAL

The law is well grounded that, an appeal is a continuation of the case put forward by parties before a lower court. It is a judicial examination by a higher court of the decision of an inferior court. An appeal is a resort to a superior court to review the decision of an inferior court and find out whether on the facts placed before it, and applying the relevant and applicable law, the inferior court came to a right or wrong decision. Therefore, a party cannot maintain on appeal a case diametrically opposed to the one maintained at the trial in the lower courtSee the cases of: (1) A.-G., Oyo v. Fairlakes Hotel Ltd. (1988) 5NWLR (Pt.92) p.1; (2) Fatumbi v. Olanloye (2004) 6-7S.C. p.68 and (3) O.S.I.E.C. v. A.C. (2010) 19NWLR (Pt. 1226) p. 273The only exception to this general rule is where in very special cases, leave of the appellate court is first sought and obtained to raise a fresh issue for the first time on appeal. PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

AVERMENTS IN PLEADINGS - STATUS OF AVERMENTS IN PLEADINGS ON WHICH NO EVIDENCE IS ADDUCED

It is a well settled principle of law that pleadings can not constitute evidence.  Hence averments in pleadings on which no evidence is adduced are deemed to have been abandoned and as mere averments, and they do not constituted proof of such facts unless such facts are admitted by the adverse party. Equally, by virtue of Section 59 of the Evidence Act (Supra), a previous judgment is a relevant fact and admissible to bar a second suit or trial.  And by Section 131 also of the Evidence Act (Supra), the Appellants have the burden of proving the existence of the said previous judgment allegedly given in favour of the 1st Appellant. What is more, a defendant who does not give evidence in support of his pleadings or in challenge of the evidence of the plaintiff, is deemed to have accepted and rested the particular substance of his case so pleaded, on the facts adduced by the other side, that is, the plaintiff. See the cases of: (1) Woluchem V. Gudi (1981) 5SC p. 291; (2) Basheer V. Same (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 236) p. 491 and (3) Ifeta V. S.P.D.C. Nig. Ltd. (2006) 8NWLR (Pt. 983) p. 585”. PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

PERVERSE DECISION - INSTANCES WHERE A PERVERSE DECISION CAN ARISE

“There are a galaxy of decisions of the Apex Court and this Court on the characteristics of a perverse judgment. In the case of: Udengwu v. Uzuegbu (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt.836) p.136, the Supreme Court per Uwaifo, J.S.C. (Rtd.) at p. 152, paras. C – D succinctly set out the characteristics of a perverse judgment as follows:

A perverse decision of a court can arise in several ways. It could be because the court ignored the facts or evidence; or that it misconceived the thrust of the case presented; or took irrelevant matters into account which substantially formed the basis of its decision; or went outside the issues canvassed by the parties to the extent of jeopardizing the merit of the case; or committed various errors that faulted the case beyond redemption. The hallmark is invariably, in all this, a miscarriage of justice, and the decision must be set aside on appeal. See Atolagbe v. Shorun (1985) 1NWLR (Pt.2) 360; Adimora v. Ajufo (1988) 3NWLR (pt.80) 1; Agbomeji v. Bakare (1998) 7S.C. (Pt.1)10; (1998) 9NWLR (Pt.56)1; Odiba v. Azege (1998) 7S.C. (Pt.1)79; (1998) 9NWLR (Pt.566)370.

-         PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

JUDGMENT BEING AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE” - MEANING OF “JUDGMENT BEING AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE”

There is nothing sacrosanct about the phrase, “judgment being against the weight of evidence”.  The phrase simply means that, when the evidence adduced by the respective parties in an action is balanced, the judgment given in favour of one party is against the weight which should have been given to the totality of the evidence before the Court.  It is a non-specific and an untamed complaint”. PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

FINDINGS OF COURT - DUTY OF AN APPELLATE COURT NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE FINDINGS OF A TRIAL COURT WHERE IT HAS DISCHARGED ITS RESPONSIBILITY

“The law is settled that where the trial Court has discharged its responsibility, the appellate court will not interfere with the findings of the trial court.  See also the cases of: (1) Fagbenro v. Arobadi (2006) 7NWLR (Pt. 978) p.172; (2) Agbi v. Ogbeh (2006) 11NWLR (Pt. 990) p. 65; (3) Otukpo v. John (2012) 7NWLR (Pt.1299) p. 357 at p. 384, paras. A – C and (4) Dakolo v. Rewane-Dakolo (2011) 16NWLR (Pt. 1272) p. 22 at p. 60, paras. E – G.  What is more, the law is quite trite that an appellate court is in as a good position as the trial court to evaluate the evidence where there can be no dispute about any relevant specific fact”. PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

TRESPASS - LEGAL INFERENCE ON THE ACTS OF TRESPASS

“In the absence of valid title, the Appellants’ purported possession of and the various acts of ownership exercised by them on the land in dispute have most assuredly amounted to acts of trespass, this is the proper legal inference. See the cases of: (1) Ekpo v. Ita (1932) 11NLR p.68; (2) Da Costa v. Ikomi (1968) 1All NLR p.394 and (3) Egbuta v. Onuna (2007) LPELR – 8244 (CA)”. PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

TRESPASS - ELEMENT OF ACT OF TRESPASS

“For the law is trite that any infraction of a right of possession into the land of another without the consent of that owner is an act of trespass actionable without any proof of damages.  See the cases of: (1) England v. Palmer (1955) 14W.A.C.A. p. 659 and (2) Ajibulu v. Ajayi (2004) 11NWLR (Pt. 885) p.458 .” PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF - ESSENCE OF AN INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

An injunctive relief is designed in law to give effect and force to successful claims for declarations and further acts of trespass in property matters. What this means is that an order of injunction will be properly awarded where a claim for declaration or trespass has or both have been proved and duly granted. An injunctive relief has been described as an equitable remedy, though without a life of its own, is symbiotic or parasitic on declaratory and trespassory claims.  Hence, once a court grants the claims for declaration and or trespass, the law mandates the court to meet these claims coupled with a prayer for an injunctive relief with approval and equally grant same.  This was the view of this Court per Ogbuinya, J.C.A., in the earlier case ofLambe v. Aremu (2012) LPELR – 9359 (CA). See also the cases of : (1) Udo v. Incorporated Trustees of Christian Methodist Episcopal Church (2008) LPELR – 8548 (CA) and (2) Cobham v. Duke (2004)2NWLR (Pt.856) p.150”. PER O. F. OMOLEYE, J.C.A

STATUTE REFERRED TO

Evidence Act, 2011
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Latest COA Cases on Whether the Law insist that there must be no Contradictions in the Evidence of Witnesses called by the same Party

ANDREW GAMBO & ANOR V IBRAHIM WAME & ORS

Appeal no: CA/YL/91/2014


AREAS OF LAW:
APPEAL, LAND LAW, LAW OF EVIDENCE, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

SUMMARY OF FACTS

The Appellant now Respondents instituted a suit before the Upper Area Court 11 Jalingo against the Respondents seeking declaratory and injunctive reliefs, among which was an order that the Plaintiffs are entitled to right of occupancy in respect of the land in dispute.

The Upper Area Court entered judgement in favour of the Appellant, hence the Respondent appealed against the said judgement to the High Court of Taraba State. The trial court in its judgement allowed the appeal and set aside the decision of the trial Court.

Dissatisfied with the trial court’s judgement, the Appellants have lodged the instant appeal before this court.


HELD

Appeal Allowed


ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

Ø  Whether the Judges of the High Court sitting in their appellate jurisdiction were justified in law when they set aside the decision of the trial Upper Area Court, Jalingo on the ground that the Appellants’ title or root of title on the land was not proved – (Ground 3).

Ø  Whether the Judges of the High Court sitting on appeal were justified in law when they set aside the decision of the trial Upper Area Court on the ground that the issue of possession of the land in dispute was not resolved by the Learned trial Judge in his judgment – (Ground 2).

Ø  Whether the Judges of the High Court sitting in their appellate jurisdiction were justified in law when they held that from the application for issuance of writ of summons up to conclusion of evidence, there is nothing therein to suggest that the Respondents/Plaintiffs sued the Appellants/Defendants in a representative capacity – (Ground 1).

RATIONES

PROOF OF TITLE TO LAND - WAYS OF PROVING TITLE TO LAND

“It is now trite law that there are five ways of proving title to land and they are by traditional evidence; by production of documents of title duly authenticated in the sense that their due execution must be proved; by positive acts of ownership extending over a sufficient length of time; by acts of long possession and enjoyment of the land; by proof of possession of connected or adjacent land in circumstances rendering it probable that the owner of such connected or adjacent land, would in addition, be the owner of the land in dispute. The law is that proof by any one of the five ways of proving ownership or title to land is sufficient. See Adesanya V. Aderounmu (2000) 6 SC (Pt. 11) 18 Ayoola V. Odofin (1984) 11 Sc 120 Nkado V. Obiano (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 503) 31 at 34 and Idundun V. Okumagba (1976) 9 – 10 SC 337”.PER J.S. ABIRIYI,J.C.A

TITLE TO LAND - DUTY OF A PLAINTIFF CLAIMING A DECLARATION OF TITLE TO LAND

“Evidence of traditional history as shown above is one of the accepted methods of establishing title to land. However a plaintiff who claims a declaration of title to land has the burden of setting out clearly by who and how the land was founded and the names of persons who had exercised acts of ownership on the land before it passed on to him. See Oyadare V. Ikeji (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt. 925) 571, Ohiaeri V. Akabeze (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 221) 1 SC and Olokotintin V. Sarumi (2002) 15 NWLR (Pt. 784) 307. PER J.S. ABIRIYI,J.C.A

CONTRADICTIONS IN THE EVIDENCE OF WITNESSES - WHETHER THE LAW INSIST THAT THERE MUST BE NO CONTRADICTIONS IN THE EVIDENCE OF WITNESSES CALLED BY THE SAME PARTY     

It is the law that contradictions by witnesses called by the same party on an issue should not be material to the extent that they cast serious doubts on the case presented by that party or as to the reliability of such witnesses. The law does not insist that there must be no contradictions in the evidence of witnesses called by the same party on an issue in contention. See Nwokoro V. Onuma (1999) LPELR – 21 26 SC; (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 631) 342. PER J.S. ABIRIYI,J.C.A

STATUTE REFERRED TO

None

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Latest COA Cases On The Requirement for Invoking the Public Officers (protection) Law of Taraba State

PASTOR DAVID D. ISHAYA ETSU V MR. SAMAILA MAIWIYA

CA/YL/65/2016


AREAS OF LAW:
ACTION, APPEAL, LIMITATION LAW, STATUTE

SUMMARY OF FACTS

The Plaintiff/Applicant claimed against the Defendants/Respondents in the High Court of Taraba State several declaratory orders some of which affected the office of the Executive Governor of Taraba State, the Attorney-General of Taraba State and the Permanent Secretary, Bureau for Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs respectively, among others. After the exchange of pleadings, the Respondents by a motion on notice sought for the dismissal of the suit for being statute barred, same having been caught by the provisions of Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap 115, Laws of Taraba State. The trial court consequently dismissed the suit after hearing the application, stating that the Plaintiff’s right of action had been extinguished by reason of late filling of the suit. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the action, the Appellant has approached this Court by a notice of appeal contending that the writ of summons and statement of claim filed on the 12th of June, 2015 was not statute- barred.

HELD

Appeal Dismissed


ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

Ø  Whether from the writ of summons and statement of claim before the trial Court, the case of the Appellant aside from an admission in a counter affidavit, can be said to be statute barred?

Ø  Whether the trial Court was right in sticking to a sub – paragraph in the Appellant’s counter affidavit and proceeded to hold that the issue of statute barred has clearly been admitted, without considering the whole counter affidavit?
Ø  Whether a court of law is not bound to consider issues validly raised by a party before it?

Ø  Whether this is one of the cases that the mistake/sin of counsel can be visited on a litigant, who has not slept over his right?

RATIONES

REPLY BRIEF - PURPOSE OF A REPLY BRIEF

“By order 18 Rule 5 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2011 a reply brief shall deal with new points arising from the Respondent’s brief”. PER J.S.ABIRIYI, J.C.A

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION - BASIS FOR A PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

“In a preliminary objection the applicant deals with law and the ground is that the Court process has not complied with the enabling law or rules of Court and therefore should be struck out. See Abba V. Shell Petroleum (2013) 4 SCNJ 90 at 103”. PER J.S.ABIRIYI, J.C.A

TECHNICALITIES - ATTITUDE OF COURTS TO TECHNICALITIES

“The trend now is for Courts to focus on substantial justice by refusing to cling to technicalities. See Akamgbo – Okadigbo V Chidi (2015) 3 SCNJ 294 at 319 and Kakih V. PDP (2014) 7 SCNJ 65 at 92 – 93”. PER J.S.ABIRIYI, J.C.A

LIMITATION LAW- ESSENCE OF A LIMITATION LAW

“The essence of a limitation law is that the legal right to enforce an action is not a perpetual right but a right generally limited by statutes. Where a statute of limitation prescribes a period within which an action should be brought, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Therefore a cause of action is statute – barred if legal proceedings cannot be commenced in respect of same because the period laid down by the limitation law had lapsed. An action which is not brought within the prescribed period offends the provisions of the law and does not give rise to a cause of action”. PER J.S.ABIRIYI, J.C.A

STATUTE BARRED ACTION - YARDSTICKS FOR DETERMINING WHETHER AN ACTION IS STATUTE BARRED

“The yardsticks for determining whether an action is statute barred include the following:

a)  The date when the cause of action accrued.

b)  The date of commencement of the suit as indicated on the writ of summons.

c)  The period of time prescribed for bringing the action to be ascertained from the statute in question.

Time begins to run for the purpose of the limitation law from the date the cause of action accrues. See Ajayi V. Adebiyi (2012) 5 SCNJ 458 at 481 per Adekeye JSC”. PER J.S.ABIRIYI, J.C.A

PUBLIC OFFICERS PROTECTION LAW - PURPORT OF THE PUBLIC OFFICERS PROTECTION LAW

“The Public Officers Protection Law is a statute of limitation. It is exact as to time and frame. It provides for three months and not a day longer than three months. See Yare V. NSWIC (2013) 5 SCNJ 406 at 422 per Galadima JSC”. PER J.S.ABIRIYI, J.C.A

RELIEF - WHETHER COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN AN ANCILLARY RELIEF WHERE IT LACKS JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THE MAIN RELIEF    

“It is the law that if the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the main relief sought it would also have no jurisdiction to entertain the ancillary reliefs. See Kakih V. PDP (2014) 7 SCNJ 65 at 105 and Tukur V. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517”.PER J.S.ABIRIYI, J.C.A

PUBLIC OFFICERS (PROTECTION) LAW OF TARABA STATE - REQUIREMENT FOR INVOKING THE PUBLIC OFFICERS (PROTECTION) LAW OF TARABA STATE

“The statute of limitation, in the case, the Public Officers (Protection) Law of Taraba State can only  be invoked in relation to an individual or person holding public office acting in due deligence and in discharge of public duties. See Momoh Vs. Okewale (1977) 6 SC (reprint) 49; Ekeogu Vs. Aliri (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt. 179) 258. The Second, Fourth and Fifth Respondents are such Public Officers. See: Ibrahim vs. JSC Kaduna State (1998) LPELR-1408 (SC).

Such Public Officers are protected by Law in the due discharge of their public functions unless it is proved otherwise- See Egbe V. Alhaji (1990) NWLR (Pt. 128) 546PER S. T.HUSANI, J.C.A

STATUTE OF LIMITATION - STATUS OF AN ACTION INSTITUTED AFTER THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD STIPULATED BY A STATUTE

“Where a statute provides for the institution of an action within a prescribed period, proceedings shall not be brought after the time prescribed by such statute. Any action instituted after the stipulated period is totally barred as the right of the plaintiff or the person injured to commence the action would have been extinguished by that law. See Egbe V. Adefarasin (No. 2) (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 3) 549)”. PER S. T.HUSANI, J.C.A


STATUTES REFERRED TO:

Court of Appeal Rules 2011

Kurmi Chiefdom Constitution Order 2015

Public Officers (Protection) Law Cap 115 Laws of Taraba State 1997
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Latest COA Cases on Whether Courts Can Compel A Plaintiff To Proceed Against A Party He Has No Desire To Sue

ALHAJI SULAIMAN IBRAHIM SAMBO (HRH. THE KPANTI ZING) V ABUBAKAR BELLO & ORS

Appeal no: CA/YL/140/2016


AREAS OF LAW:
ACTION, APPEAL, ATTORNEY GENERAL, CHIEFTAINCY MATTERS

SUMMARY OF FACTS

The 1 st Respondent took out a writ of summons in the High Court of Taraba State
against Appellant and 2 nd and 3 rd Respondents claiming a declaration that the purported selection of Kpanti Zing organized, conducted and supervised by the 3rd Defendant on the 5/11/15 is null, void and of no effect whatsoever and contrary to the laid down rules and procedure, an order declaring that the Plaintiffs were unlawfully and deliberately denied their right to participate in the selection exercise, and order directing a fresh selection exercise to be conducted by the 2nd & 3rd Respondents, in accordance with the law, laid down rules, procedure, and in accordance with native law and custom; with the Plaintiff and other interested members of the recognized ruling houses, participating amongst other reliefs.

The Appellant filed a motion on notice setting aside the 1st Respondent's writ for failure to join necessary parties to the suit and failure to accompany the writ of summons with a competent statement of claim almost at the close of pre-trial.

The lower court after considering the affidavit evidence of both parties and written addresses of their counsel, ruled that members of the Electoral college who participated in the selection of the Appellant as Kpanti or Chief of Zing are necessary
parties who should be joined as Defendants in the case. They were therefore joined by the order of court. Dissatisfied with the trial court's ruling, the Appellant has filed the instant appeal before this court.


HELD

Appeal Dismissed

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

Ø  WHETHER in the circumstances of this appeal, the trial Court was right to order suo motu the joinder of members of the Electoral College to the 1st Respondent's Originating processes pursuant to Order 13 Rule 16 (2) of the Taraba State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2011 when the 1st Respondent did not apply for joinder?


Ø  WHETHER the trial Court was right when it suo motu ordered the joinder of the members of the Electoral College to the 1st Respondent's Suit without regard to the Provisions of the Public Officer's Protection Act?


RATIONES

REPLY BRIEF - PURPOSE OF A REPLY BRIEF

"A reply brief is suppose to deal with all new points arising from the Respondent's brief. See Order 19 Rule (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2016". PER J.S.ABIRIYI, J.C.A

COURT - WHETHER COURTS CAN COMPEL A PLAINTIFF TO PROCEED AGAINST A PARTY HE HAS NO DESIRE TO SUE  

"It is settled law that the Court will not compel a plaintiff to proceed against a party he has no desire to sue. However various rules of Court provide for joinder of parties to an action. See Order 13 Rule 16 (1) and (3) and Rule 17 of the Taraba State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2011". PER J.S.ABIRIYI, J.C.A

JOINDER OF PARTIES TO AN ACTION - BASIS FOR AN APPLICATION OF JOINDER OF PARTIES     

Order 13 Rule 16 (1) and (3) provides as follows:

"16 (1) No proceedings shall be defeated by reason of misjoinder or non joinder of parties and the Court may deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interest of the parties actually before it.

(3) A Judge may order that the names of any party who ought to have been joined or whose presence before the Court is necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in the proceedings be added.

Rule 17

17 (1) Any application to add or strike out or substitute or vary the name of a plaintiff or defendant shall be made to the Court by motion."

It is clear that the rules deal essentially with joinder of parties to an action. Such joinder can be made by the Court suo motu or on application by a person who can satisfy the requirement that the joinder is necessary to enable the Court effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter. See Mogaji V. Mogaji & Ors (1986) LPELR – 1891 SC. The Supreme Court stated further that the governing principle is that the termination of litigation is in the interest of the public hence where issues between the parties involve third parties whose interests are affected and the omission of which was bound to result in further litigation such parties are those whose presence will be necessary for the effectual and complete adjudication of the matter before the Court. Their presence as parties is a sine quo non for the purpose. The plaintiff must have a claim against the person sought to be joined. Where there is no such claim against the person sought to be joined there can be no jurisdiction to make the order. See also Oduola & 2 Ors V. Coker & 1 Or (1981) LPELR – 2254 SC at 44 where Obaseki JSC stated in clear terms that a trial Judge can suo motu effect a joinder if there is clear evidence of the names of the person sought to be joined, nature of his material interest and its relevance to the issues in controversy as would show that the person to be joined is a necessary party to the suit and his presence is a sine quo non to the effectual and complete determination of the matters in controversy". PER J.S.ABIRIYI, J.C.A

ATTORNEY GENERAL - POWERS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR INSTITUTING AND DEFENDING AN ACTION

"It is settled law that the Attorney General is the Chief Law Officer of the State. He is the person vested with the responsibility under the Constitution for bringing and defending actions on behalf of the State. The Attorney General can be sued as a defendant in all civil matters in which a claim is properly made against the Federal Government or the State Government or any of its authorised agencies arising from any act or omission complained of: see Ezomo V. Attorney General of Bendel State (1986) LPELR – 1215 (SC) at page 38 – 39 and Attorney General Kano State V. Attorney General of the Federation (2007) LPELR – 618 SC page 28".PER J.S.ABIRIYI, J.C.A


STATUTES REFERRED TO

Court of Appeal Rules 2016.

Taraba State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2011
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